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NOTE
Jurisdiction Meets the Press: First
Amendment Considerations in
Jurisdictional Analysis
By KAREN HAVILAN*
Introduction
The institutional press currently is the subject of criticism for what
some perceive as its misuse of power and its shirking of responsibility.'
Despite its alleged transgressions, however, the press remains the first
line of defense in protecting the First Amendment guarantees of free-
dom of expression and the public's right to know.
2
The Supreme Court has recognized "that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that [such debate]
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials."'3 The factual errors inevi-
* B.A., 1973, University of California at San Diego; member, third year class.
1. Some of the criticism is perhaps well deserved. The National Enquirer's irresponsi-
ble journalistic practices were exposed by the recent spate of plaintiff's verdicts in libel ac-
tions against the tabloid. See, e.g., Buckley, Bravo, Burnett, 33 NAT'L REV., May 1, 1981, at
508-09. The esteemed Washington Post shamefacedly returned the Pulitzer Prize when it
was revealed that the award-winning story of a child heroin user named Jimmy was in fact a
compilation of stories about many children, written by a reporter who had falsified her re-
sume, see TIME, Apr. 27, 1981, at 52-3; NEWSWEEK, Apr. 27, 1981, at 62-3. In a recent
movie, "Absence of Malice," the house counsel for a Florida newspaper was portrayed as a
slick, jaded lawyer who advised reporters on the loopholes of libel law.
2. "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
.. .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment was made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), in which
the Court stated that "freedom of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First
Amendment from abridgement by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights
and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from im-
pairment by the States." Id at 666.
3. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 674-76 (1978). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 783 (1978) ("[T]he First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the
self-expression of individuals to prohibit the government from limiting the stock of informa-
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table in such uninhibited debate have been protected in order to give
free expression its needed "breathing space."'
Debate has only marginal value unless it is informed as well as
vigorous. "[I]nformed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints
upon misgovernment."' 5 Recognizing society's need for access to infor-
mation, the Court has found that the First Amendment goes beyond
protection of expression and protects the public's right to know,6 which
is the public's right to receive "information and ideas."7
The newspapers of this country play a necessary part in exercising
and guarding First Amendment rights. Simultaneously, they are re-
stricted by the constant threat of defamation actions.8 The risk of large
adverse judgments sometimes results in self-censorship, which inevita-
bly has a "chilling effect" on freedom of expression. It has been argued
that the decision in New York Times v. Sullivan,9 which requires proof
of "actual malice"' 0 before liability will be imposed, sufficiently pro-
tects the press from the chilling effect of the possibility of large adverse
judgments in libel actions." The mere threat of sanctions for exercis-
tion from which members of the public may draw"); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (public has a right "to receive suitable access to social, political,
aesthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences").
4. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 260.
5. Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
6. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); see also Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980).
7. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 189 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (quoting
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)).
8. For an article suggesting that wealthy individuals initiate libel actions against news-
papers that print articles opposing their interests, see Pell, Libel as a Political Weapon, THE
NATION, June 6, 1981, at 681.
9. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
10. A statement is made with "actual malice" when made "with knowledge that it is
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 376 U.S. at 279-80.
11. See, e.g., Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 182-83 (2d Cir. 1967). For
some examples of recent libel verdicts against defendants in California state court actions,
see Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Cal. 1977) ($350,000
general damages); Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979) ($50,000
general damages against author and publisher plus $25,000 punitive award against pub-
lisher); Montandon v. Triangle Publishing Co., 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186
(1975) ($150,000 general damages plus $1,000 punitive damages). See also Franklin, Win-
ners and Losers and Why: A4 Study of Defamation Litigation, A.B.A. RES. J. 455, 496 n.92
(1980). Franklin notes a $600,000 out-of-court settlement obtained by a libel plaintiff from a
newspaper defendant in 1976. Id at 461 n.16. Another observer has commented, "[An
unprecedented number of libel verdicts in the seven- or eight-figure range recently entered
at the lower court level are currently on appeal. If these verdicts are not overturned, they
could. . . encourage even more aggressive action by plaintiffs against the media." Writer
Points Out Plethora of High Rolling Defamation Suits, SAN FRANCISCO RECORDER, Oct. 6,
1981, at 10. At a conference on communications law in November, 1982, media attorneys
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ing rights protected by the First Amendment, however, also has a chil-
ling effect that has been recognized by the courts.' 2 In today's
economic climate, it is common knowledge that the cost of defending a
lawsuit, even to the point of summary judgment, is monumental. 3 The
expenses of litigation could devastate a medium or small-sized publica-
tion, or convince such a paper, already faced with escalating costs, to
cease distributing beyond its immediate locale.
Small, independent newspapers often offer the only alternative to
the mainstream view.'4 They provide information that allows the pub-
lic to participate fully in both political activities and inttellectual discus-
sions. These newspapers often print controversial or unpopular views
that act as catalysts for the free and robust debate to which our society
is committed. Such critical commentary, however, is more likely to be
the subject of an action for libel.
This Note discusses whether or not First Amendment considera-
tions should be taken into account in determining whether or not juris-
diction can be asserted over a nonresident newspaper defendant in a
defamation action. The discussion centers on the small or medium-
sized newspaper whose publishers may decide that the economic bene-
fits derived from circulation beyond the newspaper's immediate locale
predicted "more [libel] lawsuits against the press and less judicial intervention to protect the
press against . . . juries." Libel Lawyers Predict Tough Times, THE SAN DIEGO UNION,
Nov. 20, 1982, at A-23.
12. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.
13. See Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980). "The cost of
litigating a libel action, burdensome on even the largest news organizations, often can crip-
ple smaller news operations. Five years ago, the minimum cost of defending a 'full-fledged
libel suit' was estimated at $20,000. (citation omitted). The successful defense of [Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971)], was nearly $100,000.00. . . . In [Sprouse v.
Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 690-91 (W. Va.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882
(1975)], the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals expressed concern that in its state,
'where a large portion of the State is served by newspapers which lack substantial financial
assets, the threat of potential libel actions becomes repressive, not only because of possible
judgments but also because of the inordinate legal expenses normally incurred in defending
a protracted libel suit."' Steaks Unlimited, Inc., 623 F.2d at 280.
14. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1973), noted, "Nearly half of U.S. daily newspapers, representing
some three-fifths daily and Sunday circulation, are owned by newspaper groups and chains,
including diversified business conglomerates. One-newspaper towns have become the rule,
with effective competition operating in only 4 percent of our large cities." Id at 249 n.13
(quoting Balk, Background Paper, in TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE REPORT
FOR A NATIONAL NEWS COUNCIL, A FREE AND RESPONSIVE PRESS, 18 (1973)). See also
Note, Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 867 (1972). With
information and news becoming homogenized, the smaller and independent newspapers,
which often do not subscribe to the wire services of syndicated columnists, take on added
independence and importance.
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are not substantial enough to outweigh the financial burdens of defend-
ing a lawsuit in a distant forum.
Part I of this Note discusses the First Amendment 5 and reviews
the concept of personal jurisdiction as set forth in the recent decision of
World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson .6 Part II summarizes three
ways in which different courts have resolved the jurisdictional dilemma
posed by nonresident newspaper defendants in libel actions. The final
section presents the author's solution to this jurisdictional dilemma.
That section concludes that in libel actions against nonresident newspa-
per defendants, First Amendment interests should be considered by the
court in deciding whether or not it has jurisdiction over such a defend-
ant. Jurisdiction cannot be asserted consistently with due process
where it is likely that a newspaper would sever its connection with the
state asserting the jurisdiction.
I. Substantive First Amendment Considerations
and Personal Jurisdiction
A. An Overview
A brief overview of the importance of First Amendment guaran-
tees illustrates why such considerations should be part of the jurisdic-
tional analysis in an action for defamation against a nonresident press
defendant.
The First Amendment safeguards freedom of expression, which
has been called an "indispensable condition, of nearly every other form
of freedom."17 Freedom of expression is a means of attaining the truth.
As Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declared, "the best
test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the compe-
tition of the market."II All views and ideas, even unpopular ones, must
15. While the First Amendment protects expression in all aspects, including expression
through religion and association, this Note will limit discussion to the First Amendment as it
relates to freedom of expression through the press. The Note further narrows its scope by
focusing primarily on newspaper defendants in defamation actions, as opposed to magazine,
publishing, or broadcast defendants. For an explanation of the distinction between newspa-
pers and magazines with respect to circulation, see Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d
586, 590 (5th Cir. 1967).
16. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
17. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
18. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis,
J., dissenting). Justice Holmes was writing of a far different marketplace than that which we
have now, and prior to the time when "truth" could be so neatly packaged and sold. See
generally T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT (lst ed. 1969). For further criticism of
the "marketplace of ideas" theory, see L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 577. Despite criticism, the
metaphor is still employed. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951)
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be expressed and given the opportunity to compete with one another,
for it is only by that process that truth can and will emerge.
The First Amendment also secures the public's right to receive in-
formation and ideas. Enforcing this right insures full, intelligent par-
ticipation by the public in political decisionmaking. At least one
commentator has observed a direct correlation between an uninformed
electorate and ill-considered election results that are detrimental to the
public good.' 9 Unless voters have access to unfettered information, it is
not likely that democracy will operate successfully.20 The First
Amendment must protect the communication of information that is
necessary for prudent political decisions.
Freedom of expression has been called an end in itself.2 Every
individual, in the development of his personality and potentialities, has
the right to form and express beliefs and opinions. Intertwined with
that right are the individual's rights "of access to knowledge; to shape
his own views; to communicate his needs, preferences and judg-
ments."22 The First Amendment, therefore, protects intellectual, as
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 975 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'don other
grounds, 441 U.S. 153 (1978).
19. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 27 (1960).
20. Wright, Defamation, Privacy and the Public's JRiht to Know: A National Problem
and a New Approach, 46 TEX. L. REv. 630, 633 (1968). Judge Wright finds Meiklejohn's
theory--ie., that there cannot be an effective democracy without the free flow of informa-
tion-an appropriate approach to defining the scope of the "public's right to know." Id
Meiklejohn's theory, however, is problematic in that one still must determine what is a
"political question" and how much of what type of information is necessary for a "sane and
objective" judgment. L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 501. Case law may provide guidance. See,
e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
765 (1976) (information about drug prices must not be suppressed; it is vital not only to
consumer choices in a market system but also "to the formation of intelligent opinions as to
how that system ought to be regulated or altered"). A related problem in defining the scope
of the public's right to know in terms of political questions is that dissemination of political
information costs money, and candidates or groups with more money can more effectively
communicate their views. Since the Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), decided
that the First Amendment prohibits limiting campaign expenditures (as opposed to
campaign contributions), a wealthy candidate can disseminate his views more widely than
can his opponent on a shoestring budget. See TIME, Nov. 15, 1982, at 43-44. Yet a voter
who has heard from only one side is not truly informed. For further discussion of the prob-
lem of unequal dissemination of information, see Rembar, For Sale-Freedom of Speech,
THE ATL. MONTHLY, Mar., 1981, at 25, 28-31.
21. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J.,
concurring).
22. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5-6 (1966).
Laurence Tribe calls this the "emotive role of free expression." L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at
578.
Summer 19821 JURISDICTION MEETS THE PRESS
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
well as political, freedom.23
The Supreme Court has firmly established that the First Amend-
ment protects "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" expression 4 and
further protects the public's right to receive information and ideas.25
This right to receive information and ideas is the public's "right to
know.
26
The press plays a profoundly important role in securing the pub-
lie's right to know. 27 Newspapers provide the information concerning
the public and business affairs of the nation that is necessary to the
most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment-informed public
opinion. 28 Newspapers are also the foundation for the freedom of dis-
cussion that the Supreme Court has held "must embrace all issues
about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the mem-
23. See Rembar, supra note 20, at 25.
24. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
25. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972). See also Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980).
26.' See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 674-76. See also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) ("[Tlhe First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and
the self-expression of individuals to prohibit the government from limiting the stock of in-
formation from which members of the public may draw"); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (public has a right "to receive suitable access to social, polit-
ical, aesthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences").
27. It has been said that the press has a "special and constitutionally recognized role
. . . in informing and educating the public, offering criticism and providing a forum for
discussion and debate," Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). There has been much debate concerning the constitutional
guarantee of a free press and whether or not the press occupies a privileged position with
respect to the First Amendment by virtue of its status as the "fourth branch" of government.
See, e.g., Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 631 (1975) ("The primary purpose of
the constitutional guarantee of a free press was a similar one: to create a fourth institution
outside the Government as an additional check on the three official branches.") But see
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 7 (1978) (holding that the press has no constitutional
right of access to government's information superior to that of the public generally); Pel v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827-28, 30 (1974) (holding that the press enjoys no greater right
than the general public to acquire information about prison conditions). See also, First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 797-98 (Burger, C.J., concurring). For further views on a
debate that goes beyond the scope of this note, see Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom ofthe
Press A Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639
(1975); Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. RE'. 77 (1975); Nimmer,
Speech and Press: A BrieReply, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 120 (1975). Whether or not the press
is regarded as performing a special constitutional role, guaranteeing freedom from undue
interference with the acquisition and dispensation of knowledge should be deemed central to
the First Amendment. The fact that the press is particularly suited for and committed to this
task cannot be ignored.
28. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'don other g-rounds, 441 U.S. 153
(1979).
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bers of society to cope with the exigencies of their period."29
Our law also places a premium on the individual's right to be free
from unjustified harm to his or her reputation. The common law of
libel seeks to protect society's interest in protecting individuals from
false and defamatory communications.30 It recognizes the right of the
individual to be free from unjustified harm to his or her reputation.
Under certain circumstances, however, this law can conflict with the
First Amendment's guarantee of unfettered expression; libel laws,
therefore, must provide safeguards for the freedom of speech and of the
press.32 In New York Times v. Sullivan,3 3 the Supreme Court recog-
nized this principle and noted that any rule protecting, only "true"
statements will have a deterrent effect on expression that is critical of
official conduct.34 The Court in Sullivan then prescribed the standard
of proof required in an action for defamation by a public official: "[A]
public official [is prohibited] from recovering damages for a defama-
tory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that
29. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
30. Under the traditional law of libel, if the words of a publication brought injury to a
person's reputation or subjected him to "public ridicule or contempt," an action for libel
could be maintained. Absent proof that the statement was true or privileged, damages could
be recovered by the plaintiff. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 116, at 801 (4th ed. 1971).
31. The protection of private personality is basic to our concept of the "essential dignity
and worth of every human being," and hence to our constitutional system. Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). The "two-lever' theory of the First
Amendment supports this concept. It identifies classes of speech and expression not pro-
tected by the First Amendment, such as the lewd, the obscene and the profane, libelous
speech, and insulting or "fighting" words. These types of speech are not considered pro-
tected because they are seen to be nonessential to the exposition of ideas and are of such
small social value "that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942). There is, of course, always the danger that the class of unprotected speech may
expand too far, depending upon who is determining what is "nonessential" or of "small
social value." This is evidenced by the current disturbing trend of banning great works of
literature from elementary and high school library shelves. See, e.g., THE NEW YORKER,
Mar. 22, 1982, at 37.
32. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 297.
33. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
34. Id at 279. Even though a critic may believe his comments to be true, and though
they may in fact be true, a rule compelling a guarantee of the truthfulness of those comments
would result in self-censorship. This is because of the inevitable doubt as to whether or not
the truth can be proved in court or because of the fear of expenses that would be incurred in
having to do so. See, e.g., Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship 53 TEX. L. REv. 422,
424-25, 434-36 (1975) (Court in Sullivan recognized the "chilling effect" of the mere threat
of, as well as actual imposition of, sanctions for exercising activities protected by the First
Amendment). See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965); Washington Post
Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967).
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it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 35
Although the Court has placed a premium on society's interest in
affording the press First Amendment protection, both in its own right
and as essential to furthering the public's right to know, it has not
abandoned society's interest in protecting the individual from defama-
tory falsehoods. In the post-Sullivan decisions dealing with application
of the constitutional law of libel to plaintiffs who could not be classified
as "public officials" or "public figures," 36 the Court has reiterated its
commitment to society's interest in protecting the individual in his rep-
utation and privacy.
In the conflict between society's interest in protecting the individ-
ual's reputation and privacy and society's interest in unfettered expres-
sion,37 the actual malice standard of New York Times v. Sullivan gives
newspapers an additional layer of protection from adverse judgments
in libel actions by public figures or public officials, since malice is more
difficult to prove than mere negligence.38 This protection, however,
may not sufficiently protect First Amendment interests. For instance,
not all libel actions are brought by public figures. Also, editors may be
overzealous in removing any possible traces of malice from an article, a
practice that essentially constitutes censorship.39 Furthermore, the pos-
35. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
36. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 455-57 (1976); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-49 (1974); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
37. See Wright, Defamation Privacy, and the Public's Right to Kno w A National Prob-
lem andA NewApproach, 46 TEX. L. REv. 630, 633-34 (1968) ("[W]e are not here comparing
the interest of an individual in his privacy or his reputation with the interest of society in the
free flow of information. To relegate the interests of privacy and freedom from defamation
to a single individual while at the same time attaching the right to know to society as a whole
would be to prejudice the former even before the scales are erected. What we must weigh is
society'r interest in preserving each individual's right to privacy and freedom from defama-
tion against society'r interest in affording each individual full disclosure and commentary.")
(emphasis in original).
38. With this new standard of proof, the Supreme Court essentially has altered a proce-
dural element, ie., the evidentiary burdens, invoking substantive First Amendment princi-
ples in order to insulate the media from state libel laws. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254.
39. A look at the editorial process in the publishing industry provides an example of the
inhibiting effect Sullivan may have on First Amendment freedoms. See, e.g., Hotchner v.
Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., 434 U.S.
834 (1977), in which the defendant had written a biography of Ernest Hemingway with
uncomplimentary references to the plaintiff, a public figure. Prior to publication, the editor,
pursuant to recommendations of the publisher's legal department, suggested that a number
of passages be "eliminated or toned down." 551 F.2d at 912. Even though the author
"vouched for the statements" in his manuscript, he "accepted the suggested modifications."
Id Thus, self-censorship was imposed, despite the court's subsequent conclusion that
"[wihere a passage is incapable of independent verification, and where there are no convinc-
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sibility of a seven- or eight-figure verdict is not the only threat
presented by a potential libel action. The cost of litigation in a distant
forum, even if only to the point of summary judgment, is enough to
deter a newspaper from circulating its publication in foreign jurisdic-
tions. When a plaintiff brings a defamation action in his or her own
state against a nonresident newspaper, the judge sitting in the court of
the forum state must first determine whether or not it comports with
due process to assert jurisdiction over the newspaper defendant. When
the consequence of subjecting a nonresident newspaper defendant to a
foreign jurisdiction is likely to be a decision by the defendant newspa-
per no longer to publish in that state, courts should consider that First
Amendment issue in the jurisdictional analysis.
In determining whether or not a court has personal jurisdiction,
the ultimate inquiry under International Shoe4 0 and World- Wide Volk-
swagen4 is whether or not it is reasonable and fair to assert jurisdiction
over that defendant. In International Shoe, the Supreme Court estab-
lished that jurisdictional theory is based on a constitutional doctrine of
fundamental fairness:42
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment inpersonam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice. 43
The contacts with the forum state must be such "as make it reasonable,
in the context of our federal system of government, to require [defense
of] the particular suit which is brought there."'
Hanson v. Denckla45 refined the International Shoe doctrine. In
Hanson, the Supreme Court emphasized the relationship between the
nonresident defendant and the forum state, and held that it was essen-
tial in each case that there be some act by which the defendant pur-
posefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within
ing indicia of unreliability, publication of the passage cannot constitute reckless disregard
for truth." Id at 914.
40. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
41. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
42. Although the Court in International Shoe spoke only of "fair play and substantial
justice," 326 U.S. at 314, Professor Kurland has referred to these guidelines as the constitu-
tional doctrine of fundamental fairness. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process
Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 569, 590, 592
(1958).
43. 326 U.S. at 316.
44. Id at 317.
45. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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the forum state.46
Courts in later decisions determined the type and number of con-
tacts necessary to comport with the due process requirement of fair
play and substantial justice. If a corporation did "substantial" or "con-
tinuous and systematic" business in the forum, if it entered into a con-
tract there,47 or if it sent a product into the "stream of commerce" thus
making it foreseeable that the product would enter the forum, 48 it was
likely that the corporation would be subject to jurisdiction in that
state.49 If a nonresident defendant's activities were neither "substan-
tial" nor "continuous and systematic," the existence of jurisdiction de-
pended on the nature and quality of those of the defendant's contacts
that were related to the cause of action.50
The recent decision in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son51 provides a comprehensive statement of the Supreme Court's cur-
rent position regarding personal jurisdiction. In that case, a products
liability suit was brought in Oklahoma against the manufacturer, im-
porter, regional distributor, and retail dealer of an allegedly defective
automobile. None of the defendants were residents of Oklahoma. The
distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen, and the dealer unsuccessfully
challenged the Oklahoma court's assertion of jurisdiction and then un-
successfully sought a writ of prohibition from the state supreme court
to restrain the trial court judge from exercising jurisdiction over them.5"
46. Id at 253.
47. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
48. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 571, 80
Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 11. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
49. Two students of jurisdiction have proposed that the expansion of state courts' juris-
diction was the result of states' interests in protecting their citizens from the transgressions of
foreign corporations and other dangers of modem society, such as automobiles and insur-
ance companies. See Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State
Courts, 66 MICH. L. REv. 227 (1967). See also McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957) (Court found sufficient contacts to hold that California's courts had jurisdic-
tion over Texas life insurance company that mailed reinsurance certificate and premium
notice from Texas on only one policy insuring California resident); Kurland, The Supreme
Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L.
REV. 569 (1958); Note, The Growth of the International Shoe Doctrine, 16 U. CHI. L. REV.
523 (1949).
50. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 317.
51. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
52. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978). As two
justices noted, given the facts of the case and the interrelationships among manufacturers,
distributors, dealers, and service facilities of today's automobile industry, the Oklahoma
court's assertion of jurisdiction was not a farfetched, unusual, or unjust result. World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 313-19 (Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
The Court found that the constitutional requirement of "minimum
contacts" had two component functions: to protect a defendant from
"the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum," and to
prevent states, "through their courts [from reaching] out beyond the
limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a fed-
eral system."53 With respect to the latter, the Court stated that the due
process clause does not permit a state to make a binding personal judg-
ment against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state
has "no contacts, ties or relations." 4 In fact, in these circumstances,
the due process clause, acting as an instrument of federalism, may
divest the forum state of its power to render a valid judgment. This is
true regardless of whether the defendant would be inconvenienced by
being forced to litigate there, whether the forum had a strong interest in
applying its law to the controversy, or whether the forum would in fact
be the most convenient location for litigation."
The Court did not discard the other elements of the jurisdictional
formula, such as the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute,5 6 the
plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,57 the in-
terstate judicial system's interest in obtaining efficient resolution of
controversies, and the shared interest of the several states in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.58 Still, the Court's main con-
53. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292.
54. Id at 294 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319). At least
one commentator feels that after World- Wide Volkswagen, the jurisdictional question is not
one that refers to a multitude of factors and considers the administration of justice in all its
aspects, but rather one that looks only to the relationship between the forum and the indi-
vidual defendant. See Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contacts: The Supreme Court's New Juris-
dictional Theory, 15 GA. L. REv. 19, 20 (1980). See also Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and
Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REv. 872, 875-76 (1980). Perhaps this apparent pro-defendint
bias is a reaction to the prior movement of "permitting the plaintiff to insist that the defend-
ant come to him" in situations providing a basis for doing so. Von Mehren & Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1128, 1167-73
(1966). See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893,458 P.2d 571, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1969); Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22 IM. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961). This pro-defendant approach seems consistent with the Burger Court's general
concern for state sovereignty. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976). See also Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A
Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L.
REv. 407, 422 (1980).
55. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 294.
56. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
57. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
58. Id at 98. Kulko involved a child custody action between a plaintiff residing in
California and a defendant residing in New York. In its decision, the Court considered
California's participation in the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
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cern seemed to be the nonresident defendant: 9 It held that the foresee-
ability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood
that a product will find its way into a forum state, but that the defend-
ant's conduct and connection with a forum state "are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."60
The Court opined that this brand of foreseeability "gives a degree
of predictability to the legal system" that allows defendants to structure
their conduct with some assurance as to where that conduct will or will
not render them liable to suit.61 A corporation that is purposefully
availing itself of "the privilege of conducting activities within the fo-
rum State," 62 "has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can
act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insur-
ance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too
great, severing its connection with the State. '63
Application of the jurisdictional standards set forth in World- Wide
Volkswagen may not provide sufficient protection against the "chilling
effect" that a libel action against a nonresident newspaper has on the
public's right to know. While it is true that the Court's main concern in
World- Wide Volkswagen was the defendant's conduct and connection
with the forum state,' the decision also announces that due process is
satisfied if the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum are
such that it is foreseeable that the defendant will be haled into the fo-
rum state's courts.65 Under this formula, a libel plaintiff successfully
could argue that the publisher of any controversial article had every
reason to expect a lawsuit in the forum state of the citizen about whom
of 1968. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1650-1656 (West 1982). The Act permits a California
resident claiming support from-a nonresident to file a petition for support in California and
to have the merits adjudicated in the alleged nonresident obligor's state of residence, without
either party having to leave his or her own state. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. at
98-100. The fact that the Court took the effect of the Act into account may remove Kulko
from the mainstream of jurisdictional cases. At the very least, the decision is an instance in
which the Supreme Court did not make a jurisdictional decision in a vacuum, but looked to
the nature of the action, the complexity of the issues, and the substantive policies inherent in
child custody and support matters, and considered the implication of those interests in mak-
ing its decision.
59. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292, 295-97.
60. Id at 297.
61. Id Query how "predictable" World- Wide Volkswagen's definition of foreseeability
will be. In that very case, three justices thought World-Wide Volkswagen's conduct and
connection with Oklahoma were such that it should have been subject to jurisdiction there.
444 U.S. at 299-319 (Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
62. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
63. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297.
64. See id at 294.
65. Id at 292, 295-97.
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the article was written, or to which the article was directed, and that
therefore, jurisdiction could be asserted consistently with due process.66
A plaintiff also could argue that a nonresident newspaper with sub-
scribers in the forum, while not doing "continuous and systematic"
business in the forum, did have sufficient contacts related to the libel
action such that jurisdiction could be asserted.
Where the nonresident defendant is a newspaper, the assertion of
jurisdiction may concurrently impinge upon the defendant's and the
public's First Amendment rights. The mere threat of the assertion of
judicial power over a nonresident press defendant in a libel action may
come dangerously close to violating the spirit, if not the letter, of the
First Amendment's prohibition on chilling free expression if, as a re-
sult, the newspaper decides to sever its connection with that state or
resorts to self-censorship.67 In order to prevent the probable chilling
effect on newspapers if the standard jurisdictional formula is applied,
the substantive First Amendment implications of asserting jurisdiction
over a nonresident newspaper defendant should be considered in some
manner. The question is whether the due process analysis should in-
clude the First Amendment by limiting a court's jurisdiction over a
newspaper defendant if it would violate First Amendment guarantees,
or, whether the First Amendment implications of the assertion of juris-
diction should be considered separately by a court, not in connection
with the existence of its power, but rather with its decision whether to
exercise or decline to exercise that power.
B. Examples of First Amendment Considerations Affecting
Procedural Standards
The position that courts should employ substantive considerations
to either limit or extend inpersonam jurisdiction is not without prece-
dent. The expansion of inpersonam jurisdiction beyond the confines of
the territorial power theory68 arguably was premised on states' substan-
tive interests in protecting their citizens from the transgressions of for-
eign corporations and in compensating automobile accident victims.6 9
Similarly, the expansion of state court jurisdiction during the years
between International Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner was in large part a
66. See notes 160-65 and accompanying text infra.
67. For a case supporting this proposition, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
68. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), the Supreme Court held that a state's sover-
eign power, and hence the jurisdiction of its courts, was confined by the territorial bounda-
ries of the state. Id at 722.
69. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra.
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result of states' placing great weight on their interest in providing local
plaintiffs with a forum for the redress of injuries. The rationale for
such expansion of state court jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
is that "certain activities. . . so justifiably invoke protective interests of
the state that only minimal contacts are necessary. Among such activi-
ties are the operation of a motor vehicle, dealing in securities and deal-
ing in insurance."7 For example, in McGee v. International Lfe
Insurance Co. ,7 the United States Supreme Court upheld California's
assertion of jurisdiction over a Texas life insurance company, finding
sufficient minimum contacts between the company and California in a
situation where the company had mailed a reinsurance certificate and
premium notice on only one policy insuring a California resident.
If courts may extend their jurisdictional reach in certain kinds of
cases based on substantive policy considerations and find jurisdiction
where there are relatively few contacts, it seems logical that they may
also limit their jurisdictional reach based on different substantive con-
stitutional policy considerations and require a greater quantum of con-
tacts in certain cases before finding that the jurisdictional minimum has
been attained. Indeed, World-Wide Volkswagen, which counsels a less
expansive approach to long-arm jurisdiction, supports this logic for it is
in part based upon the substantive policy concerns of federalism and
respect for states' rights as evidenced by its respect for their
boundaries.72
It has been stated that there is "a discernable hierarchy among the
many interests and values which may be asserted in favor of a decision
to exercise, or to refrain from exercising, the judicial power."73 Should
the First Amendment be part of the hierarchy of values and interests
examined by courts in deciding whether to assert jurisdiction over a
nonresident press defendant? More specifically, should a court refrain
from exercising jurisdiction over such a defendant unless contacts with
the forum are so great as to outweigh the risk that the prospect of litiga-
tion might limit the newspaper defendant's circulation and thus deprive
70. Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 111 n.32, 172 N.W.2d 292, 312 n.32
(1969) (citations omitted). For a similar discussion, see, e.g., Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc.,
552 F.2d 316, 324 (10th Cir. 1977).
71. 335 U.S. 220 (1957).
72. 444 U.S. at 292-94. The dissenting justices in World- 14de Volkswagen persuasively
argued that jurisdiction could have been asserted by Oklahoma with no violation of due
process. Id at 299-319. The implication is that federalism concerns led the majority to
confine the powers of Oklahoma courts within the state's borders.
73. Carrington & Martin, supra note 49, at 23 1.
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the public of its First Amendment "right to know"?7 4
Courts have often invoked the First Amendment as the rationale
for altering traditional rules of procedure.75 For example, in New York
Times v. Sullivan,76 the Supreme Court applied substantive constitu-
tional law to effect a change in procedure in order to safeguard the
First Amendment guarantee of a free press. The Court did so by im-
posing a more exacting standard of proof on public officials who insti-
tute libel actions.77 The Sullivan case also established the procedure of
independent examination of the record upon appeal in libel actions.78
The Supreme Court later expanded the constitutional safeguards
of Sullivan to libel actions brought by "public figure" plaintiffs. 7 9 Fur-
ther changes in the evidentiary standard for libel actions have been
effected under the auspices of the First Amendment. For example, trial
courts have been more willing in the area of libel than elsewhere to
grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant, because the mere
pendency of litigation by a public official or public figure "may be as
chilling to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as fear of the
outcome itself. '80 This is particularly true when the defendant is an
advocate of an unpopular cause.
The First Amendment has impacted other areas of procedure as
well. It has provided the impetus for the Supreme Court to relax the
normal procedural rule of standing where a danger to freedom of ex-
pression is threatened by an overbroad statute.8" The First Amend-
74. Competing with the state's interest in preserving for its citizens the right to know is
the state's interest in providing citizens injured by defamation with a forum for redress.
75. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 976-80 (1977).
76. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
77. See notes 30-35 and accompanying text supra.
78. 376 U.S. at 297 n.30.
79. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
80. See Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 979 n.lI (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 155
(1979). Recently, the Supreme Court has expressed disapproval of this practice of liberally
granting media defendants summary judgment motions in public figure libel actions.
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). Although declining to rule specifically on the
issue, the Court expressed its doubt about the so-called "rule" of summary judgment on the
resolution of the actual malice question in libel actions against media defendants. Id at 120
n.9. As one commentator has noted, this indication of the Court's willingness to compel
media defendants to withstand costly jury trials in cases where a trial court might otherwise
find no genuine issue of fact, and where there is detriment to First Amendment interests, is
disturbing. Note, Defamation and the First Amendment in the 1978 Term: Diminishing Pro-
tection for the Media, 48 U. CINN. L. REv. 1027, 1030 (1979). If indeed the Court is prepar-
ing to circumscribe the liberal summary judgment policy in libel actions, that is all the more
reason to examine the First Amendment at the jurisdictional stage.
81. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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ment also has special relevance in federal removal jurisdiction,82 where
it cuts against the rule that resolves all doubts in favor of a remand to
the local state court forum. The rationale is that in a defamation case
arising out of criticism of local officials, the defendant might be subject
to the less objective judgment of local juries.83 Recently, judicial pro-
ceedings have been televised, indicating that the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of expression has been given preference over the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a fair trial.8 4
These examples undercut the position that substantive considera-
tions have no place in a procedural analysis. They support the proposi-
tion that the First Amendment should be part of the hierarchy of values
and interests examined by courts in deciding whether to assert jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident newspaper defendant,8" particularly when there
is a possibility of injury to a constitutional interest.
In the cases that have grappled with the issue of whether or not to
assert jurisdiction over nonresident press defendants in defamation ac-
tions, courts either have acknowledged their consideration of the First
Amendment in assessing jurisdiction,8 6 or, although disclaiming that
the First Amendment gives press defendants special protection, have
often adopted tests and considered factors unique to the press industry
in determining whether or not to exercise jurisdiction over newspaper
defendants.8 7
II. Three Approaches That Courts Have Applied
A. First Amendment Factors in the Due Process Determination
The case that most adamantly declares that jurisdiction cannot be
asserted consistently with due process unless it is determined that no
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1976) provides that otherwise non-removable claims may be
adjudicated in a federal district court when joined with a removable claim.
83. See, e.g., Lewis v. Time, Inc. 83 F.R.D. 455 (1979).
84. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976). California pres-
ently allows trials and judicial proceedings to be televised on an experimental basis.
85. The examples also indicate that First Amendment interests are located at the top of
the hierarchy. See note 101 and accompanying text infra; note 113 infra.
86. See notes 91-141 and accompanying text infra.
87. The latter approach may demonstrate the courts' implicit consideration of free
speech concerns. See Carrington & Martin, supra note 49, at 243. The authors state that
failure to explicitly recognize the impact of a decision on substantive interests, however,
tends to hinder understanding, promotes the use of fiction, and complicates the task of the
lawyer trying to assist a court in directly confronting the issues. The result may be more
confusion and intellectual dishonesty than could possibly result from the efforts of courts to
state candidly the ways in which jurisdiction over media cases differs from other cases they
consider).
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First Amendment interests will be unduly circumscribed is New York
Times Co. v. Connor.a In that case, the Fifth Circuit reversed an Ala-
bama district court's judgment against the New York Times ("Times")
in a libel action brought by Eugene "Bull" Connor, Police Commis-
sioner of Birmingham, Alabama, on the grounds that the district court
did not have jurisdiction over the nonresident Times. 9 The circuit
court boldly declared that "First Amendment considerations surround-
ing the law of libel require a greater showing of contact to satisfy the
due process clause than is necessary in asserting jurisdiction over other
types of tortious activity."90
The Fifth Circuit came to this conclusion after examining the con-
tacts between the Times and Alabama and finding them to be minimal.
The Times was incorporated and published in New York and main-
tained no offices, agents, or employees in Alabama. Alabama advertis-
ing accounted for only a minute fraction of one percent of the total
advertising revenue. The average daily circulation in Alabama was
about 395 copies, compared with a total average daily circulation of
659,000. The average Sunday circulation in Alabama was about 2,455
copies, compared with a total Sunday circulation of over one million.
Newspapers were mailed from New York directly to individual sub-
scribers, wholesalers, and retailers. Finally, the reporter who had been
assigned the story that was the subject of the action spent only five days
in Alabama.9
The court in Connor then looked to Buckley v. New York Times
Co. ,92 an earlier Fifth Circuit decision concerning a libel action against
a nonresident newspaper, and found that the contacts were "virtually
88. 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
89. Id at 571. On appeal, the Times argued both that its subjection to jurisdiction in
Alabama violated due process and the First Amendment, and that the jury's finding of "ac-
tual malice" was not supported by the evidence. Id at 569. The circuit court also found in
favor of the Times on the second ground after an extensive discussion of the merits. Id at
573-77. The dissent, however, noted that because the court had already found insufficient
minimum contacts, this discussion was "frank dictum." Id at 582 (Lynne, J., dissenting).
Although this dictum did not affect the conclusion that the district court lacked jurisdiction,
it is unclear why the appellate court chose to rule on the merits. Its stated reasons for
considering the merits were the facts that the parties had been before it three times on the
same matter and that Buckley v. New York Times Co. had been criticized. Id at 573. Per-
haps Judge Thornberry, the author of Connor, was merely writing an advisory opinion, or
perhaps he was not certain of his rule requiring greater contacts before jurisdiction can be
asserted consistently with the First Amendment. Thus, he bolstered his decision by pointing
out that the plaintiff also lost on the merits.
90. Id at 572.
91. Id at 570.
92. 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964).
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identical" 93 in the two cases. Connor followed Buckley in holding that
mere circulation of a periodical through the mails to subscribers and
independent distributors, sporadic newsgathering activities by reporters
on special assignment, and the solicitation of a small amount of adver-
tising do not constitute the continuous and systematic contacts neces-
sary to satisfy the constitutional conditions for the assertion of
jurisdiction.94 This aspect of the Connor decision is not particularly
controversial. Nonetheless, in reconciling its conclusion with another
recent Fifth Circuit decision, Elkhart Engineering Corp. v. Dornier
Werke,95 the court was forced to make a logical leap.
The Elkhart court asserted jurisdiction over a nonresident corpo-
ration in a suit for damages for tortious injury arising out of the corpo-
ration's activity in the forum, even though only a single transaction was
involved. Whether or not the activity was dangerous was not consid-
ered by the court in the jurisdictional analysis of Elkhart. The court in
Connor distinguished Elkhart, finding that acts by the Times, which
certainly constituted more than a single transaction, did not amount to
sufficient minimum contacts. The Times' acts were found to be insuffi-
cient because First Amendment considerations surrounding libel ac-
tions require a greater showing of contact to satisfy the due process
clause than is necessary in asserting jurisdiction over other types of tor-
tious activity. 96
At first glance, it seems possible that the principle and rationale of
Connor were applied to the wrong case. For instance, one can argue
that it is doubtful that publications such as the New York Times would
cease printing controversial articles or distributing nationwide because
of the threat of expensive libel actions in distant forums. On the other
hand, when advertising and sales revenues from a state are only a min-
ute fraction of total revenues (as little as 46/1000 of one percent in
93. 365 F.2d at 570.
94. Id The court in Connor declined to distinguish Buckley on the grounds that the
disputed article in Buckley came from an Associated Press ("AP") dispatch rather than a
Times reporter, finding instead that AP, an association of member newspapers, was as much
an agent of the Times as was one of its own staff. Id at 570-71. Although this may be
theoretically correct, as a practical matter there does seem to be a distinction between a
newspaper's sending a reporter to cover a story in a state and its purchasing an AP article
about events in a state. See Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction Over Publishers: To Chill A
Mocking Word, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 342, 357 n.90 (1967).
95. 343 F.2d 861, 868 (5th Cir. 1965). In Elkhart, a Wisconsin corporation sued in
Alabama, though it did no business in Alabama, for damages to its plane-purchased from
the defendant, a German corporation-which had crashed in Alabama during a demonstra-
tion flight performed by an employee of the defendant.
96. 365 F.2d at 572.
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Connor),97 publishers of the New York Times and newspapers similar
in size may indeed decide that the risk of defending libel actions is not
offset by the benefits derived from circulation, and cease distributing in
such forums. Judge Thornberry also was concerned with the spector of
a newspaper defendant with only a single copy circulating within a
state being subjected to jurisdiction in libel actions, where the risk of
large judgments rendered by local juries unsympathetic to the out-of-
state newspaper's alternative views would cause that newspaper to
cease distributing in the forum, and perhaps other forums as well.98
A round of criticism followed the Connor decision.99 For the most
part, the outcry stemmed from the mistaken belief that Connor's princi-
ple grants immunity to nonresident press defendants in all actions for
defamation and unfairly limits plaintiffs' choice of forum.100 Connor
was never intended, however, to set forth a rule stating that "because of
the constitutional protection of the dissemination of ideas, a publisher
may never be sued for libel in a state other than that of publication."10'
97. Id. at 570.
98. Id at 572. It is unlikely that the New York Times defendant in Connor would have
only a single copy circulating in almost any given jurisdiction. Judge Thornberry's concern
for the defendant with one lone circulating copy, while valid, was dictum.
99. See, eg., Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 182-84 (2d Cir. 1967);
Comment, supra note 94; Comment, Constitutional Limitations to Long Arm Jurisdiction in
Newspaper Libel Cases, 34 U. CHi. L. REv. 436 (1967); Note, Jurisdiction-Exercise of Juris-
diction Over A Newspaper Vacated on the Basis of the First Amendment, 35 FORDHAM L.
REv. 726 (1967). But see Carrington & Martin, supra note 49, at 227. Recent commentary
has been more favorable. See, e.g., Scott, Jurisdiction Over the Press: A Survey andAnalysis,
32 FED. COMM. L.J. 19 (1980); Casenote, Jurisdiction-Long-Arm Statute-Slanderous State-
ment Made Outside Forum State by Nonresident Causing Consequences Within Forum State
As Basisfor Jurisdiction Under Michigan Long-Arm Statute, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 263 (1979).
100. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 94, at 343; Comment, supra note 99, at 447.
101. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586, 592 n.13 (5th Cir. 1967) ("Connor
does not categorically protect all newspapers whenever or wherever sued outside of the state
of publication."). The United States Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the valid-
ity of Connor; however, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), Justice
Harlan cited Connor with approval.
In the Butts case, petitioner Butts argued that the defendant waived its right to assert
the constitutional defense of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), in the
Supreme Court because it had not raised the defense during trial. Trial was completed
before Sullivan came down, but Butts asserted (I) "that the state of the law at the time of
trial was such that" Curtis should have seen "the handwriting on the wall," and (2) that
because "some of Curtis' trial attorneys were involved in the Sullivan litigation [they] should
have been especially alert to constitutional considerations." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 143-44 (1967). The Supreme Court rejected the waiver argument. "Where the
ultimate effect of sustaining a claim of waiver might be an imposition on that valued free-
dom [ie., the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment], we are unwilling to
find waiver in circumstances which fall short of being clear and compelling." 388 U.S. at
145. The reference is to the portion of the Connor opinion that states that First Amendment
considerations surrounding the law of libel may require greater contacts for the assertion of
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This was made clear the year following Connor in Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Golino,102 another opinion written by Judge Thorberry.
In Golino, a libel action was brought in Louisiana against the non-
resident publisher of the Saturday Evening Post. In asserting jurisdic-
tion over the defendant, the court in Golino distinguished Connor by
noting the differing business activities, purposes, and motivations of
publishers of newspapers and publishers of the Saturday Evening Post,
a nationwide magazine. The court noted that most newspapers are lo-
cal in nature, while the primary aim of the defendant's magazine was to
capture a nationwide market."3
The court explained the local character of newspapers by noting
the difference between the "primary circulation" in the vicinity of a
newspaper's publication and the "passive" secondary circulation be-
yond the vicinity of publication. The latter may well be welcomed by
the newspaper, but it is not critical to the newspaper's continued exist-
ence. This secondary circulation is a product of the publication's excel-
lence rather than of a business effort to actively solicit throughout the
nation.1°4 In contrast to a magazine's solicitation, a newspaper's pas-
sive, secondary circulation should not be considered "purposeful
availment."
Having carefully considered the First Amendment issues at stake,
the court found that the publisher of a magazine directed to a nation-
wide audience had contacts with the forum state that were more than
sufficient to give rise to jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the ex-
pense of defending periodic lawsuits there or in other distant forums
would not chill the publisher's pursuit of the widest possible circula-
tion.105 Hence, the court implicitly held that there was no unconstitu-
jurisdiction than are necessary in other types of cases. Apparently, the Supreme Court
agrees with the notion that when First Amendment interests are involved, procedural stan-
dards may be heightened in order to provide maximum protection for such interests.
102. 383 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967).
103. Id at 590. A newspaper such as the Wall Street Journal is perhaps in a hybrid
category, requiring still another jurisdictional analysis based upon its methods of circulation
and solicitation and the economics of its business practices. Connor did not intend to draw a
bright line between newspapers and national magazines. Id at 592 n.13.
104. Id at 586. Secondary circulation, although perhaps not critical to the newspaper's
existence, is critical to the maintenance of the broad spectrum of ideas, which is the founda-
tion of robust public debate and a fully informed polity. A decision by a newspaper to stop
its secondary circulation because of the strong possibility of lawsuits in a distant, forum
would have an impermissible chilling effect on free expression. Id at 592.
105. "We are convinced that suits such as the present one, unless assumed to.occur in
unrealistically large numbers, will in no way inhibit the zeal with which Curtis distributes its
ideas." Id The court noted that its decision was not controlling in the case of a smaller
magazine publisher that intends a primarily local market. Id at 592 n.13.
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tional abridgement of free expression inherent in its exercise of
jurisdiction.0 6
The Golino case clarifies the rule stated by the court in Connor.
The court in Golino first reasoned that First Amendment considerations
are 'aetor[s. relevant to a determination of the jurisdictional ques-
tion,"107 and then asserted jurisdiction over Curtis Publishing Co.
("Curtis") because it was convinced the suit would have no inhibiting
effects on Curtis' dissemination of ideas.'08 Golino thus indicates that
First Amendment considerations are not the overriding jurisdictional
factor in libel actions against nonresident newspapers, but are to be
considered with other relevant factors. The First Amendment does re-
quire, however, that the defendant's contacts with the forum be suffi-
cient to overcome any threat to the public's right to know. Thus, a
newspaper defendant may have to have greater contacts with the forum
than a products liability defendant before jurisdiction can be asserted
over it without violating due process.
Golino's assurance that Connor was not intended to grant immu-
nity to all nonresident newspapers sued for libel was borne out in later
cases applying the principles set forth in Connor and refined in Golino.
Two relatively recent Fifth Circuit cases, Edwards v. Associated Press1 9
and Jebozo v. Washington Post Co. ,I1 demonstrate that even when the
First Amendment is a factor in the jurisdictional equation, courts may
still find the defendant's activities in the forum sufficient to maintain
jurisdiction in accordance with the First Amendment.
In Edwards, the court considered the following facts: Associated
Press (AP) maintained five correspondents and a maintenance em-
ployee in the forum state of Mississippi; the employees occupied an
office located in that state; and, most significantly, the news report upon
which plaintiffs' libel action was predicated was aimed exclusively at
Mississippi. I I
In asserting jurisdiction, the court focused on the defendant's in-
tent to become involved with the forum state. This intent was indicated
by the specific geographic target of the subject news report." 2 The
court noted that this specificity also gives the newspaper some indica-
106. Id at 592, 594.
107. Id at 592 (emphasis added).
108. I d at 586.
109. 512 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1975).
110. 515 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1975).
111. Edwards v. Associated Press, 512 F.2d at 267.
112. Id
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tion that it might be called into that forum to defend a suit."13 More
importantly, the court noted that AP was able to apportion the costs of
defending defamation suits among its members, thus diminishing the
risk that the costs of litigation would deter AP from distributing, news
in distant forums."14 The court in Edwards justified its assertion of ju-
risdiction by assuring itself that a chilling effect was unlikely."15
In Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., even the defendant admitted its
contacts with the forum were substantial." 6  The alleged libel was
printed in a year during which the Washington Post ("Post") derived
$42,000 in advertising revenues from Florida-related advertisements.
Additionally, during that year reporters from the Post spent 288 days in
Florida and produced over 140 published articles, and the news service
in which the Washington Post Company ("Post Company") was a joint
venturer derived almost $90,000 in revenue from Florida." 7 The court
considered whether or not the extent of the Post Company's activities
in Florida were sufficient to "ameliorate the fear that the prospect of
litigation might limit the circulation of information to which the public
is entitled.""' 8 The court concluded that the quantum of the defend-
ant's contacts made it doubtful that circulation would be limited by the
threat of defending lawsuits in the distant forum.''9
Similarly, a Texas district court made the First Amendment part
of its jurisdictional analysis in McBride v. Owens,' 20 a defamation ac-
tion against the Los Angeles Times, three smaller out-of-state newspa-
pers,' 2' and two syndicated columnists. The court echoed Rebozo and
inquired as to whether or not "the prospect of litigation might limit the
113. Id at n.36. This conclusion raises First Amendment problems. If a significant fac-
tor weighing in favor of a state's assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident newspaper
defendant is that an allegedly defamatory story was aimed at a particular locale, foreign
newspapers will become reluctant to distribute articles in a distant forum that are exclusively
aimed at that forum. This will result in the citizens of that forum being deprived of perhaps
the only alternative, controversial, commentary regarding persons and events in such a
forum.
114. Id at 268 n.41.
115. Golino'r rationale was similar. See notes 105-09 and accompanying text supra.
116. 515 F.2d 1208, 1214 (5th Cir. 1975).
117. Id. at 1210, 1215.
118. Id at 1215.
119. The court also spent some time discussing the Post Company's other enterprises,
such as Newsweek, Inc. and Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., both wholly owned sub-
sidiaries of the Post Company. Id at 1210-11. The court thus made it clear that the Post
Company was significantly present in Florida, as well as able to afford the costs of defending
a lawsuit there.
120. 454 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
121. The smaller papers are the Denver Post, the Orlando Sentinel Star, and the Long
island Press.
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circulation of information to which the public is entitled."' 22
With respect to two of the smaller newspaper defendants, the Den-
ver Post and the Sentinel Star, the court found that, given their mini-
mal amount of circulation in Texas, the answer to the above inquiry
was affirmative. The court was "compelled," under Connor and Buck-
ley v. New York Times Co., to grant defendants' their motions to dis-
miss, despite the fact that their sending newspapers to subscribers or
newstands in Texas constituted a contact resulting from an affirmative
and voluntary act.' 23
The court did not dismiss the Los Angeles Times Syndicate ("Syn-
dicate"). Three bases for jurisdiction over the Syndicate were ad-
vanced. First, the Syndicate's sale of the allegedly libelous articles to
publishers in Texas was found to be analogous to the injection by a
manufacturer of a part into the stream of commerce such that shipment
into the forum is reasonably foreseeable. Jurisdiction was based on the
single, foreseeable tortious act of injecting a libel into the forum. 24
Second, the Syndicate's agreement to forward the columnist defend-
ants' articles to Texas was found sufficient to sustain jurisdiction. 25
Third, the extent of the Syndicate's activities was found to negate any
chilling effect the litigation might have.' 26
Finally, the court in McBride likened the syndicated columnist de-
fendants to a magazine defendant that actively seeks a nationwide au-
dience'27 and found that not only did the columnists have sufficient
contacts with Texas, but that the "pecuniary benefits derived from na-
tional syndication greatly [lessened] any chilling effect caused by the
122. McBride v. Owens, 454 F. Supp. at 735-36.
123. Id at 735-36. The court did not discuss the Long Island Press, nor did it indicate
whether or not it had been dismissed.
124. Id For discussion of jurisdiction over a manufacturer in a cause of action arising
from a single tortious act within the forum, see generally Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior
Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
125. McBride v. Owens, 454 F. Supp. at 737.
126. Id. See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 1967). The
district court in McBride did not make clear whether these are concurrent or alternative
bases ofjurisdiction when First Amendment rights are implicated. It is also unclear whether
the court meant that the Syndicate's activities in general were extensive enough to ameliorate
the fear that possible litigation would limit circulation, or that its activities in Texas were
extensive enough. Provided there are sufficient contacts with the forum to satisfy World-
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson's standards, it should not matter whether the other activities
of the defendant that provide enough economic benefits to reduce the risk of the defendant
ceasing circulation in the forum occur in the forum or elsewhere. The significant point is
that the possibility of a chilling effect was in fact considered by the court in McBride and
jurisdiction asserted only upon concluding there would be no such effect.
127. McBride v. Owens, 454 F. Supp. at 737.
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prospect of litigation." 128
Connor and the cases following its directive illustrate that courts
can protect First Amendment guarantees without creating an unwieldy
jurisdictional formula and without cloaking the press with jurisdic-
tional immunity from libel actions. This is accomplished by examining
the extent of a nonresident newspaper defendant's activities in the fo-
rum in connection with the effect a defamation lawsuit might have on
future circulation in the forum. These cases conclude that jurisdiction
cannot be asserted consistently with due process, unless the nature or
extent of the defendant's activities negate the possibility of a chilling
effect on future distribution.
B. First Amendment Considerations Affecting Forum Non Conveniens
A second approach to the problem of asserting jurisdiction over a
nonresident newspaper defendant is to focus on a court's discretionary
exercise of jurisdiction rather than on its power to assert jurisdiction.
Under this approach, which was developed by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in Buckley v. New York Post Corp. ,129 a court may
have the power to assert jurisdiction, but may decline to do so because
of its belief that the forum is not convenient.
William F. Buckley, Jr. brought a defamation action in Connecti-
cut against the New York Post Corp., a Delaware corporation whose
principal place of business is in New York. The Second Circuit found
that inflicting harm within a state appeared to meet the jurisdictional
requirements of Hanson v. Denckla, 30 but did not assert jurisdiction on
this ground. Instead, the First Amendment implications were ex-
amined by the court.
The court in Buckley acknowledged the threat that libel actions
against newspapers pose to the public's right to receive information,
but chose not to follow Connor, explaining that it was likely the sub-
stantive principles of New York Times v. Sullivan provided sufficient
protection for the press.' 3' Nevertheless, the Second Circuit went on to
fashion a procedural rule that was a means to the substantive end of
protecting newspaper defendants from burdensome suits. This ap-
128. Id
129. 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967).
130. Id at 181. See notes 45-46 and accompanying text supra.
131. Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d at 182-83. Buckley v. New York Post
Corp. was, of course, decided before the Supreme Court extended Sullivan to public figure
plaintiffs in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Buckler, however, correctly
predicted that Sullivan would be extended at least to "persons who have projected them-
selves into public controversy." Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d at 182.
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proach may indicate the court's doubt that the actual malice standard
of Sullivan was sufficiently protective. Judge Friendly, writing for the
court, proposed that the First Amendment not be considered during the
court's determination of whether it has jurisdiction over a defendant,
but rather, that judges decide whether it would be consistent with the
guarantees and policy of the First Amendment to exercise jurisdiction
over a media defendant in a particular case.'3 2 In other words, "the
First Amendment could be regarded as giving forum non conveniens
special dimensions and constitutional stature in actions for defamation
against publishers and broadcasters."' 33
Applying this principle to the facts in Buckley, Judge Friendly
found nothing in the record to indicate that the New York Post ("Post")
would forego circulation in Connecticut because of the danger of a
plaintiff's verdict in a libel action before Connecticut rather than New
York jurors.'34 Judge Friendly also noted that in many respects, "the
southwestern corner of Connecticut and New York City, although di-
vided by a state boundary, are economically and intellectually one." 33
The court concluded that to hold the existence of a state border as per-
mitting the Post to invoke the First Amendment as a bar to having to
defend a libel suit by a Connecticut citizen would be to "substitute for-
malism for the reality that should be requisite"'36 before such a First
Amendment protection is afforded.
Unfortunately, the court did not detail what sort of "reality" must
exist before the First Amendment would operate to preclude a state's
exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident newspaper defendant. Ear-
132. Buckley, 373 F.2d at 182.
133. Id at 183-84. Judge Medina, concurring, was refreshingly frank when he stated, "I
am not shocked to see the principles embedded in the First Amendment applied to the
expanding subject of jurisdiction over the person. Nor would I temporize by suggesting that
this is some sort of venue orforum non conveniens problem. To me this adds an element of
unnecessary confusion." Id at 184-85 (Medina, J., concurring).
134. Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d at 184.
135. Id The court is doubtless correct that as a practical matter, the boundary between
New York and southwestern Connecticut is nonexistent. Nonetheless, World-Wide Volk-
swagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), seems particularly directed to this kind of analysis
with its emphasis on states' boundaries and the limits imposed on states "as coequal sover-
eigns in a federal system." Id at 292. After World- Wide Volkswagen, it is irrelevant if two
states are economically and intellectually one-a defendant still must have minimum con-
tacts such that assertion of jurisdiction will not offend fairness and justice. In Buckley, "an
average of 1707 copies of the daily and 2100 copies of the weekend edition of the New York
Post were distributed in Connecticut to dealers and subscribers, not to mention the indeter-
minable number of copies purchased in New York and taken into Connecticut by commut-
ers." Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d at 177. The court in Buckley implies, but
does not make clear, that these connections alone would be sufficient for jurisdiction.
136. Buckley, 373 F.2d at 177 (emphasis added).
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lier in the Buckley opinion, however, the court stated the normative
principle it extracted from Connor and the subsequent cases:
"[Jlurisdiction over an action against an out-of-state newspaper for cir-
culating a libel within the state . . . cannot be asserted consistently
with due process 'where the size of his [sic] circulation does not balance
the danger of this liability.' "137 "This liability" was interpreted as
meaning "the added danger of being sued in the state of circulation
before 'local juries incensed by the out-of-state newspaper's coverage of
local events' rather than in the state of circulation." 138 The real danger,
of course, is that newspapers will cease distributing out-of-state in or-
der to avoid the large verdicts. If the court in Buckley meant that the
reality requisite to applying the First Amendment as a bar to the exer-
cise of jurisdiction by a forum was that the amount of circulation in
that forum, and the benefits derived therefrom, be sufficient to offset
the possibility that a newspaper would cease distributing there, then
Buckley is essentially tracking Connor. The crucial difference is that
Buckley speaks in terms of exercising jurisdiction rather than the exist-
ence of jurisdiction.
C. The First Amendment Not An Element of the Jurisdictional
Formula, but Newspapers Treated Differently from Other
Defendants
Other courts have declined to follow the precedent of either New
York Times v. Connor or Buckley v. New York Post Corp. These courts
believe that freedom of expression is fully served by New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan "actual malice standard, and further disapprove of in-
corporating substantive First Amendment issues in preliminary proce-
dural analysis, due process or otherwise. At the same time, these courts
have treated newspaper defendants differently from defendants in
products liability actions and often have considered the merits of the
plaintiffs action in determining whether or not to assert jurisdiction.
Ultimately then, these courts also have employed special procedures in
order to prevent an impermissible chilling effect on the public's right to
know.
This type of analysis is exemplified in Church of Scientology v. Ad-
ams, a Ninth Circuit case. 139 InAdams, suit was brought in California
by the California Church of Scientology against the authors of alleg-
edly libelous articles about Scientology, and against the Pulitzer Pub-
137. Id at 182 (quoting New York Times v. Connor, 365 F.2d at 572).
138. Buckley, 373 F.2d at 182 n.8.
139. 584 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1978).
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lishing Company, the publisher of the Missouri newspaper that had
printed the articles. The articles made specific reference to the Mis-
souri Church of Scientology, but no reference was made to the Califor-
nia Church or its members.' 40
Reviewing Pulitzer's contacts with California, the court found that
neither the advertising revenues it received from California nor the
contacts with California of an independently operated subsidiary were
sufficient bases for jurisdiction.' 41 The court concluded that the only
relevant contact Pulitzer had with the forum was the distribution in
California of about 150 copies of the allegedly libelous article. 42
Using the traditional basis for assertion of jurisdiction in a prod-
ucts liability case, the Ninth Circuit could have stated that Pulitzer pur-
posefully sent its "product" into the stream of commerce, knowing it
would reach the forum state and that it created a potential risk of in-
jury.1 43 The court, however, did not adopt this analysis, and instead
found that in libel cases
the likelihood that an offending publication will enter a forum is
[not] a fair measure of the reasonableness of the exercise ofjuris-
diction over a publisher. The nature of the press is such that cop-
ies of most major newspapers will be located throughout the
world, and we do not think it consistent with fairness to subject
publishers to personal jurisdiction solely because an insignificant
number of copies of their newspaper were circulated in the forum
state. In a defamation case, therefore, the appropriatejurisdictional
analysis should be to determine whether or not it was foreseeable
that a risk of injury by defamation would arise in the forum
state.
1 44
140. Id at 895.
141. Id at 896-97.
142. The court found that advertising revenues were not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction.
It stated that the nonresident Pulitzer's contacts with California companies for advertising
purposes were not related to the libel, but instead gave those companies a chance to reach
customers outside of California, and was not evidence of an intent to publish in California or
reach readers there. Id (emphasis added). This is interesting because other courts have
used advertising revenues as one element of contact. See, e.g., Rebozo v. Washington Post
Co., 515 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1975); New York Times v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
Focusing on contacts evidencing the defendant's intent topublish in the forum, rather than
on all its business contacts with the forum, reduced the amount of contacts to merely 150
copies of the disputed article, in effect dictating a finding of insufficient contacts.
143. See note 127 and accompanying text supra.
144. Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d at 897-98 (emphasis added). This "spe-
cial" jurisdictional analysis invoked because of the peculiar nature of the press is, after
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), the very analysis to be
used in products liability cases. There, the Court stated: "But the foreseeability that is criti-
cal to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the
forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State
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Applying the fofeseeability of risk of injury by defamation stan-
dard, the court found that although the defendant publisher did mail
copies of the newspaper to regular subscribers and delivered copies to
some independent distributors, it had little reason to expect a risk of
injury from defamation in that state. This determination was based
primarily on the court's examination of the merits of the lawsuit and
the conclusion that it was doubtful whether the Church of Scientology
could prove that the articles were published "of and concerning" the
plaintiff, 4 ' an essential element in a cause of action for libel. 46
Significantly, the court in Adams concluded that the risk of defam-
atory injury was not foreseeable only after it examined the merits of the
libel action. Surely proving the foreseeability of a risk of injury arising
in the forum requires more extensive foraging into the merits of the
action than determining whether or not the prospect of litigation would
limit future circulation. Although the court in Adams ostensibly de-
clined to weigh the First Amendment with other jurisdictional fac-
tors, 47 it appears to have given the newspaper defendant preferential
treatment by inquiring into the merits of the defamation action at the
jurisdictional stage.
Under a different set of facts, the test employed in Adams may not
be protective enough. For example, where an allegedly libelous article
clearly is "of and concerning" the plaintiff, employing the standard of
foreseeability that a risk of injury would arise in the forum state would
provide little protection against the assertion of jurisdiction over a
newspaper that circulates only a few copies in the forum. 4 In addi-
tion, a court using this test may decline to examine the "of and con-
cerning" issue and assert jurisdiction whenever the newspaper has
are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." 444 U.S. at 297.
For a pre-Connor and pre-World- Wide Volkswagen case employing logic similar to World-
Wide Volkswagen, see Roy v. North Am. Newspaper Alliance, Inc., 205 A.2d 844, 847 (N.H.
1964) (asserting jurisdiction, the court reasoned, "the defendant could reasonably anticipate
that the sale, distribution and promotion of the... column and other news features might
entail libel actions."). Compare Roy with World- Wide Volkswagen, which, although deny-
ing jurisdiction, employed a similar test: "[the defendant] should reasonably anticipate be-
ing haled into court there." 444 U.S. at 297. For a case applying the World-Wide
Volkswagen standard in a libel action, see Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, Inc. v.
Pharmacy Reports, 486 F. Supp. 606 (E.D. La. 1980).
145. Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d at 898-99.
146. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 460 (West 1973). In essence, the Ninth Circuit was
mixing jurisdiction and summary judgment analysis.
147. 584 F.2d at 899.
148. This is because jurisdiction may be asserted consistently with due process where
there is some nexus among the contacts and the cause of action alleged. See, e.g., Forsythe
v. Overmyer, 576 F.2d 779, 782 (9th Cir. 1978) (nexus was circulation).
[Vol. 9:975
JURISDICTION MEETS THE PRESS
subscribers in a forum, reasoning that it is foreseeable that a risk of
injury by defamation could arise when articles are sent into the forum.
The California Court of Appeals has similarly declined to weigh
the First Amendment at the jurisdictional stage in Sipple v. Des Moines
Register & Tribune Co. 149 Sipple arose out of the attempted assassina-
tion of former President Gerald R. Ford by Sarah Jane Moore. Sipple,
an ex-Marine, had helped frustrate the attempt on Ford's life. Included
in the publicity following the incident were articles published in out-of-
state newspapers that had purchased accounts of the thwarted attempt
from the Los Angeles Times news service. These articles stated rather
explicitly that Sipple was a homosexual. Sipple, together with his law-
yer and minister, called a press conference and alleged injury to family
relationships as a result of the publicity. He then filed a lawsuit against
the Des Moines Register & Tribune Company and others for invasion
of privacy.1 50
Declining to apply the Connor test, the appellate court proposed
that the First Amendment "fails to give special protection from juris-
diction to defendants whose tortious acts performed out of state arise
from exercise of rights arguably protected by the First Amendment."'' 51
The court pointed out that although Connor seemed to give such spe-
cial protections, that decision had been criticized and appeared to have
been "discarded" by the very court that wrote the decision.'
52
149. 82 Cal. App. 3d 143, 147 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1978).
150. Id at 146-47, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 61. Sipple's calling a press conference and then
filing an action for invasion of privacy seems curious, if not inherently contradictory. The
court of appeal took note of this contradiction. 82 Cal. App. 3d at 147 n.1, 147 Cal. Rptr. at
61 n.1. Since Sipple concerned an action for invasion of privacy, it involved different inter-
ests than those at stake in libel actions. The balance is not society's interest in promoting
First Amendment values against society's interest in protecting individuals from defamatory
falsehoods, but rather whether or not the interest in privacy is outweighed by newsworthi-
ness. For further discussion of this matter, see generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 802-18 (4th ed. 1971).
151. Sipple v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d at 149, 147 Cal. Rptr.
at 63.
152. Id, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 63. Connor, in fact, has not been discarded. To the contrary,
Connor is alive and still cited as controlling authority. See Gonzales v. Atlanta Constr., 4
MEDIA L. RPTR. (BNA) 2146, 2148 (N.D. Ill. 1979). Both Sypple and Church ofScientology
v. Adams cite David v. National Lampoon, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 1097, 1100 (D.S.C. 1977), and
Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d 316, 324 (10th Cir. 1977), as stating that Connor had
been discarded. Yet David and Anselmi are too hasty in announcing the demise of Connor.
David was incorrect in contending that the Fifth Circuit discarded Connor in Curtis Publish-
ing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967). As discussed at notes 103-09 and accompa-
nying text supra, Golino tempered the Connor decision, but continued to call for the
consideration of First Amendment values at the jurisdictional stage in an action for defama-
tion. The court in David also overlooked the fact that in Golino, Judge Thornberry noted
the distinction between the local character of a newspaper and the national character of a
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Nevertheless, the court held that the defendant newspapers' con-
tacts with California were insignificant. The court examined factors it
found pertinent to the assertion of jurisdiction over a newspaper de-
fendant: the distant place of publication, the insignificant amount of
circulation, the lack of reporter contact with the forum, the lack of in-
tention to transmit the story to California newspapers, and the fact that
the story was not particularly aimed at or expected to receive greater
attention in California. The court found that "there was little more
than publication of an article which would conceivably have a tortious
effect in California. No other case has authorized jurisdiction on so
little." 1
5 3
Despite this emphatic conclusion, the court further explained its
decision not to assert jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the genera-
tion of income from the incidental distribution of a local newspaper
from a distant state in California "is so fortuitous or unforeseeable as to
negative the existence of an intent" on the part of the newspaper to
engage in business within California.' 54 By so rationalizing, the court
gave more protection to newspaper defendants than to products liabil-
ity defendants, the latter having been subjected to jurisdiction on the
basis of what arguably are fortuitous and unforeseeable contacts.' 55
This is not too different from Connor's finding that the First Amend-
magazine actively pursuing a nationwide market, and found that jurisdiction could be as-
serted over the latter because of the minimal risk of a "chilling effect" on a national maga-
zine's distribution in distant forums. In David, the defendant, National Lampoon, pursued a
nationwide market and the court found it had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
state. David v. National Lampoon, Inc., 432 F. Supp. at 1 l00. Therefore, the court could
have asserted jurisdiction over the National Lampoon consistently with the rationale of
Golino without claiming to discard Connor in the process. Anselmi likewise cited Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Golno as evidence of the Fifth Circuit's retraction of the Connor decision.
Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d at 324. InAnseiri, the defendant seeking dismissal
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was the wealthy Times-Mirror Corporation. It is
doubtful that Times-Mirror would be forced to limit its nationwide publishing activities
because of the expense of lawsuits. The circuit court inAnselmi also could have reversed the
trial court's dismissal of the Times-Mirror Corporation without transgressing the principle
of Connor See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967) (Supreme Court
citing Connor with approval).
153. Sipple v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d at 152, 147 Cal. Rptr.
at 64. Yet there is only a fine line between publishing an article that could conceivabl have
a tortious effect in the forum, and publishing an article that makes it foreseeable that a risk
of tortious injury by defamation would arise in the forum state. The latter was found to be a
sufficient basis for jurisdiction by the Ninth Circuit. See notes 142-47 and accompanying
text supra.
154. Sipple v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d at 152, 147 Cal. Rptr.
at 65.
155. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1969).
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ment requires greater contacts when the nonresident defendant is a
newspaper. 5 6
Not all courts that insist the First Amendment is not a factor in
their decisions surreptitiously manipulate procedure in order to give
press defendants additional protection. For example, a Tenth Circuit
case, Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc. ,' denied defendant Times-Mirror
Corporation's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The court viewed the transaction that led to the libel action as a whole.
It found that the defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum state,
Wyoming, and that the libelous article was "a special event."' 58 Three
Times reporters were dispatched to Wyoming to write the story, which
carried a Wyoming dateline, had substantial reader interest, and was
"colorful, [and]. . . explosive."' 15 9 The court concluded that the fore-
seeability critical to due process was that "the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably an-
ticipate being haled into court there."'1
60
The court in Anselmi maintained that, even if the First Amend-
ment were made a factor in jurisdictional determinations, it would be
outweighed by the countervailing policy consideration against forcing a
plaintiff to travel to the home of the newspaper in order to vindicate his
reputation.' 6 ' This is a legitimate concern. Should an injured plaintiff,
who has an interest in reestablishing his good name in his own commu-
nity, be made to travel to a distant state in order to bring a defamation
action, particularly when witnesses and evidence are located in the
plaintiff's home state? ' 62 A better way of dealing with these conflicting
156. The fact that Spple was a privacy action rather than a defamation action may also
have led the court to rule in favor of the press defendants. Privacy actions seek damages for
injury to "feeling and sensibilities," while defamation actions seek compensation for harm to
reputation. On the other hand, both privacy and defamation principles "involve restrictions
upon freedom of expression which raise serious questions under the First Amendment."
Note, Privacy, Defamation, and the First,4mendment: The Implications of Time, Inc. v. Hill,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 926 (1967).
157. 552 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1977).
158. Id at 325.
159. Id
160. Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d at 325. This analysis is problematic. If a
major factor weighing in favor of a state's assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident news-
paper defendant is that a story is colorful, explosive, and interesting to readers in a particu-
lar locale, foreign newspapers, which can provide more objective reporting, will be reluctant
to print stories about or distribute in that locale, thus impairing the citizens' constitutional
right to know. For a review of this proposition, see discussion of Edwards v. Associated
Press at note 113 supra.
161. See Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d at 324-25.
162. The added publicity of a trial may in fact make it more desirable for the plaintiff to
seek damages in a distant forum. The community at large does not adhere to the belief that
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interests is not to ignore the First Amendment implications, or to con-
clusively state that in every case the countervailing policy in favor of
the plaintiff outweighs the First Amendment considerations. Rather, in
each case the plaintiff's interests should be weighed against the First
Amendment interests and other jurisdictional factors in order to deter-
mine whether or not jurisdiction exists.
The analysis of these cases reveals that many of those courts most
adamantly opposed to applying First Amendment values as factors in
the due process personal jurisdiction equation, find themselves examin-
ing the consequences of assertion of jurisdiction over newspaper de-
fendants in terms of First Amendment analysis. Perhaps the most
accurate assessment of the conffict that arises when the First and Four-
teenth Amendments confront one another was made by the trial court
in Buckley v. New York Post Corp. :63 "If the law of libel represents an
effort to balance the competing policies favoring freedom of the press
and protection of reputation, First Amendment considerations neces-
sarily find their way into the jurisdictional assessment."' 64  In that
statement, "necessarily" may not have been used in the sense of a rule
of law, but as a statement of jurisprudential fact. The discussion of
cases in which courts have grappled with the issue of assertion ofjuris-
diction over nonresident media defendants illustrates that the First
Amendment does enter into the courts' analysis.
Conclusion
First Amendment interests cannot be fully protected by a tradi-
tional jurisdictional analysis in defamation actions against newspaper
defendants. As the discussion of theAdams, Spple, andAnselmi cases
illustrates, where courts apply a traditional minimum contacts ap-
proach, they often consider only whether the defendant could expect
that litigation would arise as a result of a news story or whether the
story was directed to a specific forum. While the specificity with which
an article is written is relevant to a determination of a newspaper de-
fendant's contacts with the forum, this factor, if considered the determi-
native element in the jurisdictional equation, would undercut First
Amendment protections. Foreign newspapers, rather than being en-
one is "innocent until proven guilty" and the realities of a defamation action mean that the
plaintiff is as much on trial as the defendant. The result may be further besmirchment of the
plaintiff's reputation rather than vindication. Note also that the plaintiff is not being de-
prived of a forum, but rather is forced to go to the defendant.
163. 260 F. Supp. 282 (D. Conn. 1966).
164. Id at 285 (citations omitted).
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couraged to present alternative viewpoints and to promote public de-
bate, would be discouraged from sending controversial articles to
places where they are needed most.
Libel plaintiffs may argue that World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. 165
provides newspapers sufficient protection against unreasonable asser-
tions of jurisdiction. Although World-Wide Volkswagen appears to
protect a nonresident newspaper because of its emphasis on the defend-
ant's contacts and its refinement of the foreseeability requirement, a
closer look reveals that World- Wide Volkswagen does not sufficiently
shield a nonresident press defendant, absent special recognition of First
Amendment considerations.
66
In World- Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court stated that when a
corporation "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State,"'161 it has notice that it is subject to
suit there and "can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by
procuting insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if
the risks are too great, severing its connection with their State."'168
When the defendant is a newspaper, this latter alternative cannot
occur without violating the First Amendment right of the public to be
free from government interference with its receipt of information. 169
165. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
166. At least one court since World-Wide Volkswagen has purported to apply its standard
to an action for defamation against an out-of-state publisher. See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros.
Giant Super Markets, Inc. v. Pharmacy Reports, 486 F. Supp. 606, 612 (E.D. La. 1980). In
Schwegmann Bros., the district court found that the defendant had sufficient contacts with
the forum and was not "surprised" by the suit. Nevertheless, the court examined the First
Amendment and concluded that, due to the offending publication's character as essentially a
professional newsletter, the possibility of a chilling effect was remote. Jurisdiction was as-
serted. Id at 611-13. Note that the court did not stop with an examination of contacts and
foreseeability, but continued to analyze the chilling effect, asserting jurisdiction only upon a
finding that the likelihood of a chilling effect was remote.
167. 444 U.S. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1957)).
168. 444 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added).
169. Libel plaintiffs could argue that a newspaper with a minimal number of mail order
subscribers in a foreign forum has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities based on the fact that it derives revenue from the subscriptions. The subscribers'
names and addresses in the newspaper's files provide evidence that the defendant was con-
ducting activities in the forum. The newspaper, therefore, has notice that it is potentially
subject to a defamation suit in the forum. Another possible argument is that the publisher of
any controversial article has every reason to expect to be haled into the courts of the forum
state of citizens about whom the article was written, or to which the article was directed.
Under World-Wide Volkswagen, jurisdiction could thus be asserted consistently with due
process, but at the expense of the First Amendment. A newspaper that severs its connection
with a state in order to avoid the risk of burdensome litigation violates the First Amendment
rights of the subscribers in that state. World- Wide Volkswagen's jurisdictional standard is
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Neither may a newspaper "structure its conduct"' 17 ° so as to provide
some assurance that the conduct will not subject it to suit in a given
locale. Any "structured conduct" by a newspaper beyond fair and re-
sponsible journalistic practices is the equivalent of self-censorship,
which is not tolerable under the First Amendment.
Finally, the argument that media defendants are sufficiently pro-
tected from the chilling effects of litigation by the Sullivan decision
must be addressed. As noted above, 17 1 the expense of a motion for
summary judgment is in itself a threat to the full exercise of freedom of
expression. Furthermore, if indeed the Supreme Court is retrenching
the doctrine of liberal summary judgments in libel actions against the
media, 72 the press, particularly smaller newspapers, may steer wide of
any controversial commentary where "actual malice" could be alleged.
Since neither Sullivan's actual malice standard nor the application
of traditional jurisdictional formulas sufficiently protect against the
chilling effect of libel actions on the public's right to know, something
more is needed. To include. First Amendment considerations into the
jurisdictional formula would not impermissibly violate traditional doc-
trines. The minimum contacts test was never meant to be a rigid
formula; rather, the requisite contacts of a defendant with a forum
should vary depending on the measure of values affected by the exer-
cise of power. 173 First Amendment values are often necessarily affected
by courts' assertion of power in actions against nonresident newspa-
pers; therefore, courts should consider the First Amendment ramifica-
tions of any assertion of jurisdiction.
Indeea, the spirit of World- Wide Volkswagen sanctions this ap-
proach with its emphasis on the conduct and the connection of the de-
fendant with the forum state. Surely when the defendant is a
newspaper, the First Amendment implications of its conduct should be
examined. Furthermore, World- Wide Volkswagen states that one of
the factors to be considered in the jurisdictional equation is "the shared
interest of the several States in furthering" fundamental substantive so-
cial policies. 74 If substantive social policies are to be considered, then
not enough to insure that jurisdiction will be asserted consistently with the notions of fair
play and substantial justice when the defendant is a foreign newspaper.
170. 444 U.S. at 294.
171. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
172. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
173. See, e.g., In re: Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liab. Litig.,
526 F. Supp. 887, 909 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the
Jurisdiction of State Courts, supra note 49, at 230.
174. 444 U.S. at 292.
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the constitutional "policy" of freedom of expression guaranteed by the
First Amendment, and the possibility of injury to First Amendment
interests, also should be considered.175
Therefore, when the defendant in a libel action is a nonresident
newspaper, the inquiry must go beyond whether or not there has been
purposeful availment and beyond the defendant's expectations of
where it might conceivably be sued. Specifically, the inquiry should be
whether the defendant's contacts with and activities in the forum are
such as to "ameliorate the fear that the prospect of litigation might
limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled.' ' 76
If a court determines that it is more likely than not that a newspaper
will sever its connections with the forum rather than undergo the risk
of being called there to defend suit, thus depriving the residents of their
First Amendment right to know, the court should not assert jurisdiction
over that defendant.
The next question, then, is at what point should a court ask itself
whether or not a newspaper defendant's contacts are sufficient to ame-
liorate the fear that the prospect of litigation might limit the circulation
to which the public is entitled. Should this issue be considered as part
of the court's application of the jurisdictional formulas of International
Shoe and World- Wide Volkswagen, or after the existence of jurisdic-
tion has been established, when the court, in its discretion, is determin-
ing whether or not to exercise that power, in effect, a constitutional
species offorum non conveniens? 77
Under the first approach, a court would calculate the amount of
the defendant's contacts, including the extent of its purposeful avail-
ment and how foreseeable it was that the defendant would be haled
into the courts of the forum. 78 The court would then ask whether or
not asserting jurisdiction over the particular defendant would comport
with fair play and substantial justice, weighing and balancing the con-
175. This view has the support of Justice Brennan. Although he sympathized with the
plaintiff in his dissenting opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice Brennan implied that
if a defendant can show that injury to a constitutionally protected interest would result from
being forced to go to a particular forum, the defendant should not have to appear there. 444
U.S. at 312 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967).
177. The latter method was the approach used by the second circuit in Buckley v. New
York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967). Note the dissent by Justice Medina. Id at
184-85 (Medina, J., dissenting). See notes 129-38 and accompanying text supra.
178. For a chronicle of the types of contacts and factors courts generally examine when
Taking a jurisdictional determination in libel actions against nonresident newspaper de-
fendants, see Scott, Jurisdiction Over The Press: A Survey andAnalysi, 32 FED. COM. L.J. 19
(1980).
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flicting interests of the defendant, the plaintiff, and the state in the con-
troversy. 79 It is at this point that the court should determine whether
or not the amount of contacts is sufficient to offset the possibility of any
chilling effect caused by the defendant limiting circulation. If the court
determines that it is more likely than not that the defendant would
sever its connections with the forum rather than undergo the risk of
being called there to defend suits, then the contacts are not sufficient to
provide jurisdiction.
Under the second approach, a court would follow the procedure
used in Buckley v. New York Post Corp. ,180 by making a traditional
examination of the amount of contacts and fairness of asserting juris-
diction. If the court found there were sufficient minimum contacts for
it to assert jurisdiction, then, under International Shoe, it would have
power over the newspaper defendant. If the court found that the likely
effect of asserting jurisdiction would be the newspaper's ceasing to cir-
culate in distant forums, it would choose not to exercise its jurisdiction.
The first of these two approaches is the better one. It requires that
the First Amendment be a central part of the jurisdictional analysis,
and does not relegate a constitutional right to a trial court's discretion.
This latter consideration is especially important since appellate courts
seldom reverse trial courts' discretionary rulings, while decisions based
on constitutional law merit de novo review.
While the "institutional" press is likely to have weighty enough
contacts for a court to assert jurisdiction without fear of a resulting
"chilling effect," smaller, independent newspapers rarely, if ever, will
have such contacts. The inconvenience to the libeled plaintiff and the
interest of the forum state in protecting an injured individual is far out-
weighed by the collective interest of the state's citizenry in free and
unfettered receipt of information. "In areas of doubt and confficting
considerations, it is thought better to err on the side of free speech."''
179. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
180. 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967).
181. Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
834 (1977).
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